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intermediary is justified. Conditions to assure bank-runs as an eqUilibrium phenomenon are 
derived, and a welfare analysis of two devices that have traditionally been used by banks in order 
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currently discussed in the literature. 
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1.- Introduction 
Until the 1930s, the US financial system was hampered by banking panics. The social and economic 
importance of the phenomenon attracted considerable research effort (e.g., Gurley and Shaw [18], Tobin [25], 
Friedman and Schwartz [15], Stiglitz [24]), which aimed at explaining why panics occurred. 
Recent research of the banking theory, however, has provided additional insights into the underlying 
reasons of panics, especially by examining the economic function of deposit contracts (e.g. Diamond and Dybvig 
[12], Bhattacharya and Gale [3], Bhattacharya and Jacklin [2] and Chari and Jagannathan [9]). This latter stream 
of research has approached banking panics through two different types of models. 
First, the models of pure panic runs comprise those models in which bank runs occur as random 
phenomena, with no correlation with other economic variables. Diamond and Dybvig [12] made a significant 
contribution by introducing into the model the demand for liquidity and the transformation service provided by 
banks. They demonstrated that demand deposit contracts, which enable the transformation of illiquid assets into 
more liquid liabilities, provide a rationale both for the existence of banks and for their vulnerability to runs. The 
optimal contract yields a higher level of consumption for those who withdraw early than the technological return. 
Bank runs, thus, take place when the idea of deposit withdrawals spills over economic agents (an essential point 
is that banks satisfy a sequential service constraint). The model states that under no aggregate uncertainty, a 
suspension of convertibility policy can hinder the bank run equilibrium. Otherwise, a deposit insurance policy 
would be more effective. Diamond and Dybvig's model attracted severe criticisms (e.g., Gorton [17]) for 
assuming that bank runs are random phenomena, and thus, uncorrelated with other economic variables. Gorton 
[17], in an empirical study of bank runs in the US during the National Banking Era (1863-1913), found support 
for the notion that bank runs tended to occur after business cycle peaks. Bhattacharya and Gale [3] considered 
a variation of the Diamond and Dybvig's model with many intermediaries subjected to privately observed 
liquidity shocks. They demonstrated that unconstrained walrasian trading among intermediaries would lead to 
underinvestment in liquid assets. Moreover, their model showed the welfare gains from setting up an institution 
such as a central bank, offering borrowing and lending opportunities at a subsidized rate. 
Second, models of information-induced runs assert that bank runs occur due to the diffusion of negative 
information among depositors about bank's solvency (e.g., Bhattacharya and Jacklin [2] and Chari and 
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Jagannathan [9]). Bhattacharya and Jacklin [2] examined the relative degrees of risk-sharing provided by bank 
deposit and traded equity contracts. They focused on the relationship between riskness and information of the 
stream of returns and the desirability of equity over deposit contracts. They found that deposit contracts tended 
to the better for financing low risk assets. Chari and Jagannathan [9] drew on both information-induced and pure 
panic runs models! to study the effects of extra market constraints, such as suspension of convertibility on bank 
runs. They concluded that such constraints prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations. Despite the 
importance of this contribution, it raised considerable criticisms due for: i) the ambiguous role of banks or any 
other financial intermediary in the model, ii) being assumed that individuals were risk neutral. 
This paper intends to fill several research gaps of the recent theory on banking panics. First, this study 
introduces risk-averse preferences in Chari and Jagannathan's model. The importance of this extension rests on 
the distinctive role of financial intermediaries in the economy, especially by providing insurance to individuals 
subject to preference shocks. Second, this paper examines the optimal intervention mechanism from a public 
finance perspective: the choice between suspension of convertibility or deposit insurance, given their relative 
benefits and costs (of randomization in meeting liquidity needs or dead weight taxation). In this framework, 
suspension does no longer lead to an improvement of ex-ante utility and is not always the preferred instrument 
to cope with runs. The level of risk-aversion and the dispersion of the random asset, measured by the standard 
deviation, are crucial variables to the analysis. The numerical simulations shown in this paper suggest that 
deposit insurance should only be restricted to finance low risk assets. In this sense, the results of this paper 
support the "narrow banking" idea that has been currently discussed in the literature. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: The basic framework of the model is presented in section 2, 
the ex-ante (banker's) contract and the ex-post (depositors') problems are defined in sections 2.1 and 2.2 
respectively. A condition to assure a panic run is derived in section 3. Section 4 analyzes two traditional devices 
in order to prevent runs and a welfare comparison of both measures is presented in section 5. Section 6 ends 
the paper with some conclusions with respect to the above public measures. 
2.- The model 
The model can be summarized as follows: 
(i) Hypotheses 
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(a) Three period economy, T=O, 1,2 
(b) A single commodity. 
(c) Investment technology: There are two investment technologies on the side of the 
intermediary : 
• A short-term asset at T=O that yields one unit at T=J 
• A long-term asset at T=O that yields a random return R at T=2. For 
simplicity, it is assumed that the long-term technology cannot be liquidated 
early (or equivalently, only at a 10ss)2. 
The random return is defined as follows: 
RE(Rh,Rl) with p.d! (l-p,p) and RI-O [I] 
• It is also assumed that the probability of the low return occurring (p), is 
sufficiently small. As it will be seen later on, this assumption allows to 
simplify the ex-ante contract. 
(d) Preferences: There is a continuum of ex-ante identical agents at T=O that maximize 
expected utility of consumption. They are subject at T=I to a privately observed 
uninsurable risk of being of either of two types. 
• Type-l agents derive only utility from consumption in period one. 
• Type-2 agents derive utility from consumption in both periods 1 and 2, i.e: 
Type-I agents UI(c"c2,PI)=PIU(cI)+(1-PI)U(c2) 
Type-2 agents U2(CI'C2,P2)=P2U(CI)+(l-P2)U(C2) 
It is assumed that O~p2<PI~I and PI-I. 
The proportion of type-l agents is stochastic and defined as: 
iE(tl't) with p.d! ('1"2) and 'l+r2=1 
t1 <t2 
(e) Initial endowments: All agents are endowed with one unit of the good at T=O. 
[2] 
[3] 
(f) Information: At T=I a random fraction, ii, oftype-2 individuals receives information 
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about time 2 returns3• 
It is assumed that this information is perfect. 
The random variable a, is defined as follows: 
a E(O, a) with p.d! (l-q,q) [4] 
It is observed that in some states of nature, there will be no informed agents in the model. 
As in Chari and Jagannathan [9], the random proportion of type-l agents is needed in order to create 
confusion between a large withdrawal queue size at the bank due to liquidity shocks, t2 realized, or negative 
information shocks. 
(g) Parameter restrictions: In order for individuals to have a non-trivial signalling 
extraction problem, the following parameter restriction is assumed, (it will become 
clear later why this assumption is needed). 
[5] 
Ch) Utility functions: Considering the agents' preferences hypothesis and in order to get 
numerical results, the following form for the utility function is assumed: 
[6] 
where k is a constant and i = 1, 2.4 
(ii) Data 
The state of nature is described by the vector 8 = (t, a, R) that contains the three random variables that 
are identical and independently distributed. 
Table I shows the different states of nature and its associated probabilities. 
2. 1. - The banking contract: The ex-ante program. 
Formally, the demand deposit contract may be defined as a contract that requires an initial investment 
at T=O with the intermediary in exchange for the right to withdraw per unit of initial investment (at the 
discretion of depositor and conditional on the bank's solvency) either: 
(i) cll units in period I and C21 units in period 2 
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(ii) C 12 units in period 1 and C22 units in period 2 
As shown by Jacklin [19], the demand deposit contract optimally combines the two types of deposits 
that banks usually hold, a time deposit and a more typical demand deposit contract. 
That is, at T=O or ex-ante period, individuals deposit their unit of endowment at the bank and are 
offered a menu of contracts. At T= 1 or interim period, depositors select their preferred contract (given their 
liquidity needs or information received). 
A combination of these contracts is also possible, being the case of depositors allowed to withdraw at T= 1 
part of the second period withdrawal stream (subject to some early withdrawal penalty/. 
The optimal contract choice for a deposit contract in the absence of interim information can be obtained 
by maximizing the aggregate expected utility of agents, that is, as the solution to the following problem: 
[7] 
s.t. ic ll +(1-i)C I2 :!>K [8] 
iC21 +(I-i)c22~(1-K)R 
~ [Uj(cljAj'Pj)]~~ [Uj(C li ,c2i'Pj)] for i1}; i,j=1,2 [9] 
R R 
where: 
C 1j Consumption at time T= 1 for the type j agent 
c2j Consumption at time T=2 for the type j agent dependent on the random return R (c2iR» 
K Investment in the liquid short-lived asset at T=O 
l-K Investment in the illiquid long-lived asset at T=O 
R Random return of the long-lived asset at T=2. 
The first two constraints represent resource balance constraints while the last two show the incentive 
compatibility constraints that guarantee that type-l depositors will prefer their withdrawal stream to the type-2 
withdrawal stream and viceversa, that is, the contract is designed so that depositors self-select their type contract. 
Given that the ex-ante probability of RI is sufficiently small, the ex-ante contract has been approximated 
ignoring consumption changes produced by interim signals. Moreover, the bank solves the ex-ante contract for 
the average t 6. These simplifications are instrumental for finding an analytical solution to the ex-ante contract. 
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Applying Kunh-Tucker conditions, the optimal solution is obtained. 
Lemma 1.- The optimal demand deposit contract satisfies: Cl1 >CI2 and C22>C21 ~O 
Proof: See Appendix A.I for a detailed resolution of the problem. 
2.2.- The ex-post problem 
In the interim stage, the liquidity and information shocks are realized, and so every individual learns 
his or her type and also some type-2 agents will be informed about the return of the long-term asset at T=2. 
Given the liquidity needs or information received by individuals, they will select a contract to maximize their 
utility function. The choices of the individuals are defined by the dimensionless coefficients ~l' ~I and ~2 
respectively, explained in footnote 5. 
The behaviour of the different agents is formulated as follows: 
(i) Type-I agents 
The value of ~I is chosen in order to maximize their utility function and subject to their two 
period constraint; that is: 
max 
I 1 (k+CI)I-y [(k+Ci- Y ]) U (CI'C2 ,PI) = max PI +(1-PI)E ---=--~I ~I l-y l-y 
s.t Cl =C12 + ~I (C l1 -C I2) [10] 
C2 =C21 + (1- f.L I)(C22 -C21) 
~1!>1 
The solution to the type-l problem is given by Lemma 2: 
Lemma 2.- Absent any information, type-l agents will always select their own contract, that is, the 
optimal solution to the type-l problem is ~;=1 (cII' C21 ). 
Proof: See Appendix A.2. 
The solution to the type-l problem is trivial, as these individuals do not care about second 
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period consumption, therefore they will withdraw to consume in the interim period. 
(ii) Informed type-2 agents. 
In each state and conditional on the information about R they solve the following problem: 
with: cl =C12 + 1l/(Cl1 -C12) 
C2 =C2l +(1-Il/)(C22 -C21 ) 
Il/:S; 1 
[11] 
[12] 
There are two different values for 11/, depending on the information about R received by these 
agents at T= 1 . 
These solutions are defined by the following lemmas: 
Lemma 3.- If type-2 agents receive positive information concerning the asset's return, they would 
choose a combination of the two contracts, that is: 
[13] 
Proof: See Appendix A.2. 
Lemma 4.- If type-2 agents receive negative information concerning the asset's return they will always 
claim the type-l contract that is, the optimal solution is 11;=1 (cl1 , C21 ). 
Proof: See Appendix A.2. 
(Hi) Uninformed type-2 agents. 
These agents maximize expected utility conditional on the observation of a noisy signal, which 
is the withdrawal queue size at the bank, or equivalently, the level of aggregate demanded consumption 
(CT) at T=l. The coefficient 1l2=lliC1) is chosen in order to maximize: 
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s.t. Cl =C I2 + 1-1 2 (C lI -CI2 ) 
C2 =C2l + (1-112) (C22 -C21) 
1-12:5: 1 
The solution to the uninformed agents' problem is given by: 
[14] 
[15] 
and where 1t; represents the sum of probabilities of all the states of nature that give for the same value of 112 
the same value of aggregate consumption, and for which R = Rh. 
Proof: See Appendix A.2. 
3.- Condition to assure a panic run 
Bank runs occur whenever uninformed type-2 agents start making type-l withdrawals upon observation 
of aggregate consumption at T= 1. Conditions for both information-induced and pure panic runs to occur are 
given by Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1.- In the model, bank runs occur as a unique equilibrium, if the following conditions hold: 
[16] 
[17] 
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where: 
(l-p)(l-q) 
1t 2 •• 1 
P 1t = 1.,1 l-q +pq l-q+pq 
(l-P)'2 p['lq +'2(1-q)] 
[18] 
1t 1.-0 
'Ipq +'2 (l-q) +'2 (l-p)q 1t2 •• 0 'Ipq +'2 (l-q) + ,z<l-p)q 
and cl' C2 as defined in the uninformed type-2 agents maximization problem. 
1t II': I and 1t21': I represent the sum of probabilities of all the states of nature that give for j.1 = 1 the same value 
of aggregate consumption (1tII'=1 if R=Rh and 1t21'=1 if R=R/). Equivalently, 1t11'=0 and 1t21'=0 represent the 
sum of probabilities of all the states of nature that give for j.1 =0 the same value of aggregate consumption 
(1t 1 if R=Rh and 1t2 if R=R/). 1'=0 1'=0 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
If these conditions are satisfied there are bank-runs in states 3, 4 and 6 and the levels of aggregate 
demanded consumption are the ones given by column 5 in Table I. It is observed that aggregate demanded 
consumption in those states is cJJ ' which exceeds ex-ante planned consumption at T=1 or the investment in the 
liquid asset K. In fact, 
[19] 
and C JJ >C I2 by definition of the optimal deposit contract. 
Whenever the withdrawal queue size at the bank exceeds the ex-ante investment in the liquid asset, the 
bank suspends convertibility, as will be seen in subsection 4.1. 
In all these cases, bank runs occur as a unique equilibrium. In states 3 and 6 there exist information-
induced runs as there is a negative information shock. However in state 4 there is a pure panic run as there is 
no adverse information held by any agent in this state. 
4.- Public intervention 
Coordination problems derived from deposit contracting are considered important due to the fear of 
systematic risk. An example may be found in the banking panics that ocurred in the 1930s and the strict 
regulation that was imposed as a reaction to the crisis. In spite of these measures being effective in preventing 
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bank runs, they have created some additional problems, which provides some rationale for banking regulation. 
Deposit insurance exemplifies this situation as is considered the most effective tool to prevent runs, but with a 
high cost associated to it. Banks are not only induced to take excessive risks but depositors have no incentives 
to monitor their banks (moral hazard problem). 
The aim of this section is to compare suspension of convertibility versus deposit insurance, given their 
relative benefits and costs (of randomization in meeting liquidity needs or deadweight taxation). 
4.1.- Suspension of convertibility 
It is a measure that banks have historically used against runs, in the pre-deposit insurance era. 
In the model suspension of convertibility occurs at the level of the highest proportion of early diers, 
that is: 
[20] 
where K is the ex-ante investment planned by the bank in the liquid asset and G is a subsidy received from the 
government in order to cover withdrawals up to the highest proportion of early diers (acting like a lender-of-Iast-
resort). 
However, in the ex-post situation, there may be some states of nature for which the value of aggregate 
consumption CTI is greater than the assumed ex-ante one. 
The value of the aggregate demanded consumption C-TI in state 8=(t, ii, R) at T= 1 is given by the 
expression: 
[21] 
and where cell represents the consumption at date 1 of type-l agents (value of Cl obtained in (i» and cc 121' cc 12 
that of informed and uninformed type-2 agents respectively (obtained in (ii) and (iii». 
Then, the deficit ACTI is defined as follows: 
A C-Tl = C-TI - (K +G) 
ACTl =0 
11 
if C-Tl ~K+G 
if CTI<K+G 
[~:2] 
This deficit in consumption has to be shared among the different agents. In the model, it is assumed 
that each depositor arrives in line randomly at the bank and the depositors are then treated on a first-come-first-
served basis. Let P be the random proportion of agents of each type that supports the deficit with respect to the 
total number of the same type of agents, thus, these agents will receive what was planned in the ex-ante analysis, 
Le.: 
P = _ IlCT1 _ [23] 
(I - t)[ci (cc121 - C12) + (I - ci)(CCI2 - c 12) 1 + t (ccll -C12) 
It should be noted that P ~O because 1-1 1, 1-11 and 1-12 are positive numbers and CCll' CC 12I and CC 12 >C I2 • 
The consumptions are then: 
Type-l agents: 
CC:~ =ccll for the first (1- P) i 
SI 
CC21 = CC21 type -1 agents [24] 
cc:~ = C 12 for the last pi 
S2 
CC21 = CC21 type -1 agents 
Informed type-2 agents: 
SI 
cC22I = CC221 type - 2 agents [25] 
cc :~I = C 12 for the last p ci (1 - i) informed 
Uninformed type-2 agents: 
CC:~ =CCI2 for the first (1- P)(I- ci)(l-i) uninformed 
SI 
CC22 = CC22 type - 2 agents [26] 
CC:~=CI2 for the last P(1-ci)(l-i) uninformed 
S2 
CC22 =CC22 type-2 agents 
Given these modified consumption levels after suspension, the aggregate expected utility , UT' is defined 
as follows: 
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[27] 
where 8 = 1, .. ,6 
The welfare measure to be considered in this study will be: 
cert.equivalent(E U r) - [~ G p(8) 1 (1 + s) 8=3,4,5,6 [28] 
The subsidy G is received from the government in order to cover withdrawals up to the highest 
proportion of early diers. It would be like a deadweight tax on individuals of value s. 
4.2.- Deposit insurance 
In the model it is assumed that there is government deposit insurance of the bank deposits at T=2. This 
insurance removes the incentives of agents to become informed and so information-induced runs will no longer 
occur. In this case, it is assumed that agents will consume what was planned in the ex-ante contract. 
Whenever the realized benefit at T=2, R (1-K) is less than the assumed consumption for that period, 
that is, tC21 + (I-t) c22 , the difference is always supplied by the government. The expected cost of the insurance 
would be: 
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Cd= L [tC2I +(1-t)C22 - R6(1-K)]p(6) 
6 
[29] 
The expected cost of the insurance may be considered also as a deadweight tax on individuals and so 
the welfare measure for deposit insurance will be: 
cert. equivalent (Uexante) - Cd(1 +s) -[~ G p(8) ](1 +s) 8=4,5,6 [30] 
where G is also the subsidy received from the government to cover the liquidity shock, that is, in those states 
of nature in which t2 is realized. 
5.- Comparison among the different public intervention measures: numerical examples 
In the numerical simulations, it has been assumed the lowest proportion of type-! agents (tI) is realized 
with a high probability (rI =0.99). The motivation for this assumption is to create confusion between a large 
withdrawal queue size at the bank, due to a high liquidity shock (t2 realized), or a negative information shock. 
It is also assumed that the probability of the low value of the random return occuring (RI) is sufficiently small 
(p =0.10), and this in turn simplifies the ex-ante contract maximization problem. The data used in the 
simulations are shown in Table 11. 
The sensitivity analysis has been carried out with respect to the relative risk-aversion coefficient (y), 
and the standard deviation of the random return, R, (keeping the mean return constant and increasing the 
dispersion of R)7. 
Figure 1 shows the certainty equivalent of the utility attained with suspension of convertibility minus 
deposit insurance, as a function of the relative risk aversion coefficient (y) and for different values of the 
standard deviation of the random return (measured as a fR). It can be se.en that for Iow values of y, suspension 
would be welfare superior. On the other hand, deposit insurance would be better for intermediate values of y 
(up to y = 1.70), lastly, from then on, suspension yields again higher utility8. As a increases, suspension is 
welfare superior for nearly all levels of risk-aversion and for very risky investments suspension would be always 
the preferred measure. 
Figure 2 gives the certainty equivalent of the utility attained with suspension of convertibility minus 
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deposit insurance as a function of the standard deviation of the random return (measured as a /R)- and for 
different values of y . It can be observed that as aiR increases suspension becomes the preferred measure to 
cope with runs. 
These figures suggest that deposit insurance should only be restricted to finance low risk assets, that 
is, it gives support for the "narrow banking" proposal that has been currently discussed in the literature. 
With respect to the other parameters, variations in the value of deadweight tax (s) do not have a 
significant effect on the value of the welfare measures and the sensitivity analysis with respect to the proportion 
of early diers is ambiguous as it means also a variation in the proportion of informed agents (given the parameter 
restrictions defined in equation [5]). Finally, one possible extension would be to let both agents have interior 
preferences, with type-l individuals deriving relatively more utility from consumption in the first period with 
respect to type-2. In this case, however, only numerical solutions may be possible. 
6.- Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
This paper introduces risk-averse preferences in Chari and Jagannathan's model. A first motivation for 
this extension was to give a positive role for a financial intermediary in the economy. The introduction of risk-
aversion in Chari and Jagannathan's model, implies an ex-ante definition of the optimal insurance contract. This 
transformation service (through the demand deposit contract) is one of the important functions performed by 
banks. 
Once the banking contract or ex-ante program has been designed, all agents solve their maximization 
problem in the interim period conditional on their information (if any) and they decide on their level of 
consumption for both periods. Conditions to assure bank-runs (both information-induced and "panic" runs) are 
derived. 
A second motivation for this extension was to complete Chari and Jagannathan's welfare analysis, by 
comparing suspension of convertibility versus deposit insurance, given their relative benefits and costs (of 
randomization in meeting liquidity needs or deadweight taxation). 
The numerical results have shown that in all cases, as the dispersion of the random return increases, 
suspension of convertibility improves with respect to deposit insurance. For very risky investments, suspension 
would be the preferred measure to prevent runs. 
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In general, the results of this paper support a radical policy proposal that aims to restrict insured 
liabilities to finance very low risk assets. This proposal, known as "narrow banking", would consist in dividing 
the banking industry into two types of banks: a "narrow" group of banks, whose deposits would be insured, and 
who are restricted in their assets' choices and a broad class of banks, with greater flexibility in the use of their 
uninsured deposits. The narrow banking idea has received support in the literature, among others, by Kareken 
[21], Boot and Greenbaum [7], Jacklin [20] and Craine [10]. 
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Appendix 
A.- Maximization problems 
A. 1. - Ex-ante Contract 
In the ex ante contract maximization problem both i (the proportion of type-l agents) and R (the return 
on the long-term asset) are random variables. 
A first simplification to the problem has been done by substituting i by its expected value t = t I r I + t2 r 2 • 
The bank solves its ex-ante program for the average proportion of type-! agents9 • 
Taking this into consideration, the maximization problem defined by equations [7], [8] and [9] is 
approximated as follows: 
[31] 
[32] 
~ [uj(C 1j ,C2j , Pj)]~~ [Uj(C 1i ,C2i , Pj )] for it}; i,j=I,2 
R R 
[33] 
where the two resource constraints have been substituted by a unique constraint. 
The second type of uncertainty reflects the fact that, having invested in a risky technology, the bank 
may not be able to make its promised second period payments in full. One way to think of this, is that the bank 
promises an amount (c21' c22 ) it will be able to pay if R = Rh. If R = RI really occurs, the bank is considered 
insolvent and depositors get RI of their promised payments. It is then assumed that: 
Rh 
[34] 
Given this dependence between consumption and returns, the above maximization problem is 
reformulated as follows 10: 
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max 
( 
(k+c )I-y [(k+C )I-y]) 
t PI 11 +(1-P I )E 21 + l-y l-y [35] 
( 
(k+c )I-y [(k+C )I-y]) 
+(1-t) P2 12 +(1-P2)E 22 
l-y l-y 
s.t. 
( C
21 ) ( C22 ) t C 11 + Rh + (1 - t) C 12 + Rh = 1 
(k+c )1-y [(k+C )1-Y] (k+c )1-y [(k+C )1-Y] 
PI 11 +(I- Pl)E 21 ~PI 12 +(1-Pl)E 22 l-y l-y l-y l-y 
[36] 
(k+c )I-y [(k+C )1-Y] (k+c )I-y [(k+C )1-Y] 
12 +(I-)E 22 ~ 11 +(I-)E 21 
P2 1 P2 1 P2 1 P2 1 
-y -y -y -y 
and where A l' A2, A3 are the multipliers associated with the corresponding resource and incentive constraints. 
In this maximization problem, it can be shown that the incentive constraint for type-l agents is never 
binding and that of type-2 agents may be binding (depending on the exogenous parameters that are considered, 
as will be seen below). 
The F.O.C to the above maximization problem are: 
aL =1-t(C11 + C21 )_(I-t)(CI2 + C22 )=0 ~1 Rh Rh 
aL (k+c )1-y (k+c )I-y (k+c )I-y (k+c )1-y 
- 12 +(1 )E 22 11 -(1- P2)E 21 =0 
aA
3 
- P 2 l-y - P 2 l-y - P2 l-y l-y 
The new unknowns are introduced: 
Clj=c1j+k 
C2j=c2j +k where: j=l, 2 
Given that Pl- 1, it is assumed the corner solution C21 =k (or C21 =0). 
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[a] 
[b] 
[cl 
[37] 
[d] 
le] 
fJ1 
[38] 
(i) The two incentive constraints are never binding (A2 = 0, A3 = 0). 
The first order conditions become: 
aL .-y '0 
-.- =cl1 tPI -tAl = 
aCU 
a!- =8;'((l-p)t(l-PI)-_t A1!>0 
aC21 Rh 
a!- =8;; (l-t) P2 -(l-t)A I =0 
aC12 
aL .-y )( )(1 ) (l-t) , 0 
-.-=C22(l-P 1-t -P2 ---11. 1 = aC22 Rh 
[a] 
Cb] 
[cl 
Cd] 
:~I =1+(1+ ~)k-t(811+ ~)-(1-t)(812+ ~)=O re] 
From [39][a] and [39][c]: From [39][a] and [39][d]: 
[40] 
Substituting [40] and [41] in [39][ e] the value of 811 is obtained. 
In this case it is assumed that the incentive constraint for type-2 agents is not binding, that is: 
[39] 
[41] 
[42] 
[43] 
Substituting the optimal consumption levels in the above expression, a condition on the relative risk-
aversion coefficient (y) for this case to hold is obtained. 
19 
(ii) The incentive constraint for type-l agents is not binding and that of type-2 is binding (A2 =0, A3>0). 
The first order conditions become: 
From [44][c]: 
From [44][d]: 
From [45] and [46]: 
From [44][a]: 
From [45] and [48]: 
a~ =c;i(tP I - P2 A3)-tA I =0 
aCJl 
a~ =c;i (l-p) [t(1- PI) -(1- P2) A3]-~' Al ~O 
aC21 Rh 
a~ =c;i[(1-t)P2+ P2A3]-(I-t)AI =O aCI2 
aL A-Y (1-t) 
-A- =C22 (1-p) [(1-tHl - P2) + (1- P2) A3] - --Al =0 
aC22 Rh 
aL ( 1 ) ( C21 ) ( C22 ) - = 1 + 1 + - k - t c + - - (1 - t) c + - = 0 
aA Rh 11 Rh 12 Rh 
1 
A = -(I-t)[I-~1 3 A-Y 
CI2 P2 
A = -(1-t) 1-----"----
[
AI I 
3 c;i Rh(1-pHl - P2) 
Cll =[ (1 -p)Rh 1 ~:21~ c" 
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[a] 
[b] 
[cl 
[44] 
[d] 
re] 
[f1 
[45] 
[46] 
[47] 
[48] 
[49] 
where: 
[SO] 
B=----
(l-t) P2 
Substituting in [44)[e], [47] and [49]: 
[51] 
Subsituting in [44][f]: 
[52] 
The solution to the non linear equation [47] yields a value for (\2' and from it the rest of the unknowns 
of the problem are obtained. 
-1/1 
[53] 
The ex-ante contract has been solved assuming Rl-O. The more general case in which R[,t-O (sensitivity 
analysis with respect to R) has been solved applying the Newton-Raphson technique to the F.O.C in Equation 
[37]. 
A.2.- Ex-Post Problem 
A.2.1.- Type-1 agents 
The value of 1-11 is chosen in order to maximize their utility function a.id subject to their two period 
constraint; that is: 
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maxU I (cl'C2 )= 
1'1 
S.t 
1 
( Rl)I-Y) I I k+c-(k+c) -Y (k+c ) -Y 2 Rh 
max PI I +(I-P I) (l-p) 2 +p-'-----'--
1'1 1 - Y 1 - Y l-y 
Cl =C 12 + IJ.I (c 11 -c 12) 
c 2 =C21 + (1 -IJ. IHc22 -c2 ) 
IJ. I :s 1 
The F.O.C of the problem are: 
and given that P I-I the multiplier associated with the constraint is: 
and therefore the constraint is always binding, that is, IJ. I =l 
A.2.2.- Informed type-2 agents 
In each state and conditional on the information about R they solve the following problem: 
with: Cl =C12 + 1J.[(Cll -CI2) 
C2 =C21 +(1-IJ.[HC22 -C21 ) 
lJ.[d 
[54] 
[55] 
[56] 
[57] 
[58] 
There are two different values for IJ.[, depending on the information about the random return (R) 
received by these agents at T= 1 . 
(i) If R=Rh is the information received at date 1, then the informed type-2 agents find their 
consumption by solving the following problem: 
[59] 
22 
with Cl =C12 + Il/Cll-CI2) 
The F.O.C of the problem are: 
with solution: 
C2 =C21 + (1- 11 J)(C22 -C2l) 
IlJs! 
[60] 
[61] 
[62] 
(ii) If R=RI is the value of R revealed to type-2 agents, then the level of consumption is obtained 
in a similar way as above: 
with: Cl =C12 + Il/(C ll -CI2 ) 
The F.O.C of the problem are: 
and therefore the value of Al is: 
which implies 11[=1 
A.2.3.- Uninformed type-2 agents 
C2 =CZI + (1- 11) (CZZ -CZI ) 
Ills! 
Their maximization problem is given by: 
23 
[63] 
[64] 
[65] 
[66] 
is: 
S.t. cl "'CI~ "" 1i~(Cj1 =('I~) 
(.'2 "('11 .... (1-f11)(~~n -('it) 
p,::;;! 
[67] 
The value of CT depends on each state of nature e ... (t. (I: ./b with probability P(8) and its expression 
[68] 
and where 1:.'(;11 represents the consumption at date 1 of type-l agents and (.-c.;J2l,l;I:.'U! that of informed and 
uninformed type-2 agents respectively. 
The values of eT are shown in Table I. It should be observed that there for any 112 (C1) or equivalently 
any consumption level (ccn ), uninformed agents may choose, there is always confusion between states 3 and 
4 as type-I's consumption at T~l (n'B) is l:H and informed type-2's consumption in the case of a negative 
information shock (ccllL ) is also ell' 
More generally, let e' CT be defined as the finite set e\Cp e·2,Cp .... e·N,CT of all the states of nature 
that give for the same value of 1J.2=1J.2(C1) the same value of aggregate consumption. The probability of statee' i CT 
is: 
p(e'iCT) 
N 
LP(e'i,CT) 
i=1 
[69] 
The set of N states of nature can be divided into 2 groups. The first NI states correspond to R=RI and 
the last N2 to the case R=Rh. On the other side, given the independence of the random variables equation [69] 
can be rewritten: 
if O<i<NI [70] 
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where: 
And so the problem defined by [14], [67] is reformulated as follows: 
s.t. Cl =C12 + 1-12CCll-C12) 
C2 =C2l +(1-1-12)(C22-C21) 
1-12~1 
N NI 
1t~=n-p)L 1t j 1t; =p L 1t j 
j=I+NI j=1 
The solution to the uninformed agents' problem is given by: 
[71] 
[72] 
[73] 
B.- Proof of Proposition 1 
Proposition 1 assures that the optimal choice of uninformed type-2 agents in states 3, 4 and 6 is 1-1; =1, 
that is, the choice of the type-l contract. 
First, considering states 3 and 4 and due to the existence of conditional probabilities, three different 
expressions for the utility function, OFCI-12) , can be written: 
Ci) If 1-12 = 1 then aggregate consumption at date 1 would be the same for states 1, 3, 4 and 6 and 
so the conditional probabilities would be the ones given by 1t 1 and 1t2 and the utility 
~.I ~'I 
function is: 
(H) If 0 < 112 < 1 then, there is only confusion between states 3 and 4 and the conditional 
probabilities would be given by: 
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that is, 
(l-p)r2 (l-q) 
r lpq+r2 {l-q) 
p[rl q+r2 (1-q)] 
r l pq+r2 (l-q) 
The expression for the utility function would be: 
Cl =C12 + J.l2(CU -CI2) 
C2 = C21 +(1-J.l2)(C22 -C21) 
[75] 
[76] 
[77] 
(iii) Finally, if J.l2 =0, there is confusion among states 3, 4 and 511 , then the conditional 
probabilities would be 7t I and 7t2 and the utility function: 
,,-0 ,,-0 
[7S] 
First remark: [79] 
[SO] 
The utility function is continuous for 112> 0 12 , and hence in order to assure a maximum at J.l; = 1 , the 
following condition(s) should hold: 
[81] 
[S2] 
The first of these conditions is only needed when the utility function is discontinous in J.l2 = 0 . 
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In order to assure that the second condition holds, it is only necessary to look for the extreme value of q 
for which the following condition is satisfied: 
[83] 
Finally, with respect to state 6, there are two different expressions for the utility function: 
(i) For any 0 ~ ~2 < 1, state 6 is never confounded with any other state and so the uninformed 
type-2 agents assign probability one to being in state 6. The utility function is given by: 
[84] 
Cl =C12 + Il/Cll - CI2) 
C2 =C2l +(1-1l2)(C22 -C21) 
(ii) If 112 = 1, the utility function coincides with that of states 3 and 4, that is given in equation 
[75]. 
It can be shown, as before, the continuity of the utility function, and so we just need to impose that: 
[85] 
and this condition is always satisfied. 
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Table 1.- States of Nature 
'1 OR ')(l-q) 'lc-cH -+(l-t!kCI2 
2 t I a Rh. r.(l ~p)q 'IC'CH ",,(I-tl)[acC'tw",,(l ~a)C'CI~] 
3 tl et Ri r1pq t1ccll +(I-t1)[etCC12L +(1-et)CC12] Cll 
4 t2 OR r2(I-q) t2 CCll + (I - t2)cc12 cll 
5 t2 et Rh r2(1-p)q t2ccll +(!-t2)[etCCI2H+(!-et)CC12] 
6 t2 et Ri r2pq t2 cc 11 + (1 - t2)[ et cc l2L + (1 - et ) cc 12] Cll 
Table 11.- Numerical data 
0.30 0.51 0.99 0.01 0.30 0.90 0.10 1.00 0.50 0.18 
Fixed values of y 0.80 1.29 1.78 
Fixed values of the standard deviation ( a ) 0.333 0.302 0.271 
Associated value of Rh 1.200 1.189 1.178 
Associated value of RI 0.000 0.100 1.200 
Mean R 1.080 1.080 1.080 
0,07 
0,06 
0,05 
0,04 
c.. 0,03 Q) 
0 
I 
c.. 
If) 
::l 0,02 Cl) 
0,01 
° 
-0,01 
-0,02 
° 
0,5 1,5 2 2,5 3 
Gamma 
Figure 1.- Suspension minus deposit as a function ofy 
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Figure 2.- Suspension minus deposit as a function of a/mean 
Notes 
1. In the model, panic runs moy occur due to the fact that uninformed individuals condition their beliefs about the bank's long-term 
technology on the size of the withdrawal queue at the bank. If this size is large (due to a high liquidity shock only) they may nevenheless 
infer sufficiently adverse information to precipitate a bank run. 
2. One interpretation of this assumption is that the asset represents long-term loans which cannot be "called in" early andfor which no 
secondary market exists perhaps due to a "Iemmons" problem, as in Akerlof [lJ. 
3. This assumption, as in Bhattacharya and Jacklin [2J. is motivated by the fact that. if information were costly, type-2 agents would be 
more likely to purchase the information, and also if depositors were of different sizes, larger depositors would also be more likely to purchase 
the information. These unmodeled aspects are taken into account, by considering that a random proponion a of type-2 agents becomes 
informed. 
4. This junction solves the problem of zero consumption having an infinite negative value in terms of utility. when y is greater than one. 
5. Formally. this represents the choice for the depositor of ~ (0 ~ ~ ~ 1): 
~ = 1 implies the choice of the type-l contract (c 11' C21 ) 
~ =0 implies the choice of the type-2 contract (c 12' C22 ) 
0< ~ < 1 implies a combination of the two contracts 
6 .It is assumed that whenever the realized i is greater than the ex-ante one (average t ), the bank receives a subsidy from the government 
ill order to cover withdrawals up to the highest proponion of early diers. It could be seen as the government acting as lender-of-Iast-reson. 
7. The assumption Rl-O has been relaxed. although sufficiently small values for RI have been considered so that bad information about asset 
quality leads always to a run. See Appendix A.l for the calculation procedure in this case. 
8. This result may be due to the fact that in these type of utility junctions y represents the relative risk-aversion coefficient and 1/ y the 
intenemporal elasticity of substitution. A next step is to consider the "isoleastic" CES specification that separates intenemporal substitution 
and insurance effects. 
9. This simplification is justified by the "first-come-jirst-served" nature of the deposit contract. 
10. See Jacklin and Bhattacharya [2J for a proof of this result. 
11. This confusion only occurs if informed type-2 agents have also chosen 1l;;0 in state 5, otherwise, if 1l2;0 there is only confusion 
between states 3 and 4 and therefore the conditional probabilities and the utility function would coincide with those expressed in point 2). 
12. Or the utility function may be continuous in the interval [O,lJ whenever points 2) and 3) coincide, as explained in footnote 11. 
